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2 
History and International Relations1  
 
To some extent, history has always been a core feature of the international imagination. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, leading figures in the discipline such as E.H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Stanley Hoffman have all employed history as a 
means of illuminating their research. Indeed, Wight made searching the desiderata of 
international history the sine qua non of international theory, the best that could be hoped for 
in a discipline without a core problematique of its own.2 Although often considered to have 
been banished by the scientific turn in International Relations (IR) during the Cold War, at 
least in the United States, history never really went away as a tool of IR theory. And in recent 
years, the (re)turn of history has been one of the most striking features of the various 
openings in IR theory ushered in by the end of the Cold War.  
As such, this forum is extremely timely, posing a series of important questions about 
the relationship between history and International Relations, and questioning the status of 
IR’s recent historical (re)turn. The general issue is a pressing one because Fred Northedge’s 
original goal in setting up Millennium was to provide a (British) counterweight to the 
‘ahistorical positivist project’ that had engulfed mainstream American IR. Thus by bringing 
history back in, albeit in a critical way, Northedge’s thinking reflected a now commonly held 
assumption: that there is a trans-Atlantic divide that separates a historically informed British 
IR against a history-less U.S. mainstream. And in turn, these perceptions form the basis of the 
current forum.  
But in certain key respects, we want to argue that these perceptions – common as they 
are – are misrepresentations, reflecting a series of widely-held antinomies that are falsely 
assumed to underpin the discipline. The juxtaposition of history-less/ahistorical U.S. IR 
versus British historical IR is misleading because history is important to mainstream U.S. IR 
(as we explain in the first section). Moreover, we also find problematic the type of binary 
engendered by Robert Cox’s distinction between critical (historical) theory and history-
less/ahistorical problem-solving theory. The problem with this formulation is that it occludes 
a deeper, more fundamental issue, one which is rarely overtly discussed: the question of 
                                                 
1 We would particularly like to thank Justin Rosenberg for his pertinent advice though, of 
course, we take final responsibility. 
2 Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no international theory?’ In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays 
in the Theory of International Politics, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1966), 17-34. 
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whether there is a single mode of historical research in IR. 3 In this article we unravel this 
claim by posing the question: ‘what is history in IR?’ In the process, the second section of the 
piece outlines four modes of history in IR, all of which can be situated along a continuum 
ranging from macro- to micro-analysis, all of which provide different visions of history, and 
all of which deploy history in different ways. This move means searching above and beyond 
the binaries posed by this forum, whether considered as positivism vs. post-positivism, or as 
an apparently unbridgeable trans-Atlantic divide. In fact, our contention is that the central 
issue when it comes to understanding the relationship between history and IR is not one of 
‘British historical IR vs. American non-historical IR’, nor one of post-positivist ‘pure history’ 
vs. traditional ahistorical positivism. Rather, our portrayal of four ideal-typical modes of 
historical research presents quite different points of departure for considering the history-
theory relationship, which in turn has potentially important ramifications for the way that we 
‘do’ IR theory. And equally importantly, once we set-up this heuristic, we find that the 
principal camps in the so-called ‘history wars’ – namely traditional (positivist) historians and 
critical (poststructuralist-inspired) historiographers – turn out to occupy a space surprisingly 
close together.  
Asking the question ‘what is history’, therefore, leads us to a deeper understanding of 
the relationship between history and IR. Although representatives of these various historical 
modes of explanation often engage in forms of one-upmanship over what constitutes ‘true’ or 
‘proper’ historical analysis, our central claim is that all four approaches can be seen as 
legitimate modes of historical analysis. In short, we need to recognise that no-one ‘owns’ 
history. As such, our advocacy of one of these modes of analysis – historicist historical 
sociology – is made not on the basis that it delivers a truer form of historical analysis. Rather, 
we claim that the main benefit of historical sociology lies in its capacity to conduct research 
which is both rich historically and fertile theoretically. Justifying this claim, and laying out 
the core wagers – both theoretical and empirical – of historical sociology in IR, is the subject 
                                                 
3 Notable exceptions include: Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘International Relations and the 
“Problem of History”’, Millennium 34, no. 1 (2005): 115-136; Chris Hill, ‘History and 
International Relations’ in Steve Smith (ed.), International Relations: British and American 
Experiences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985); Ian Clark, ‘Divided by a common language’, 
Government and Opposition 37, no. 2 (2002), 271-279; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 
‘International History and International Relations, International Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000): 741-
754; and Zara Steiner, ‘On writing international history’, International Affairs 73, no. 3 
(1997): 531-546. For a discussion relating to International History see Patrick Finney, ‘Still 
“Marking Time”: Text, Discourse and Truth in International History’, Review of 
International Studies 27 (2001): 291-309. 
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of the third section of the paper. In the conclusion we briefly outline the consequences of 
such a move – most notably a shift towards seeing historical sociology at the centre of IR as a 
discipline.  
 
 
The eternal transatlantic divide? 
 
While most scholars have tended to treat neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as the 
representatives of mainstream U.S. IR, we would now surely have to include constructivism 
as the third prong in what can now be considered a triumvirate.4 This immediately blurs the 
claim that mainstream U.S. IR is ahistorical. For while there are clearly many varieties of 
constructivist IR, all versions reject a neo-neo instrumentalist rational actor model in which 
actors’ interests are pre-determined and universal through time and place. As such, 
constructivism is propelled towards accounts of time and place specificity, context and 
change, rendering it necessarily historical and sociological in orientation. Indeed, it fits 
unproblematically into the mode of historicist historical sociology in IR. However, although 
constructivists occupy an important place on the history-IR spectrum, it is not the case that 
neo-neo approaches lie outside of it.5 Even the apparently archetypal version of ahistoricist 
IR –Waltzian neorealism – has been historically ‘filled-in’ by theorists such as Robert Gilpin, 
John Mearsheimer, and Colin and Miriam Elman.6 Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin and others 
have applied historical analysis to a rational choice neo-liberal institutionalist research 
                                                 
4 Indeed, this point is becoming increasingly accepted. See, for example, Robert Gilpin, 
Global Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Legro and 
Moravcsik invite constructivists into a ‘meta-paradigm’ that acts as an umbrella within which 
mainstream approaches can operate; see Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is 
Anybody Still a Realist?’ International Security 24, no. 2 (1999), 5-55. On the links between 
realism and constructivism, see Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Constructive Realism’, International 
Studies Review 6, no. 2 (2004): 346-8. 
5 See also Geoffrey Roberts, ‘History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR’, Review of 
International Studies 32, no. 4 (2006): 704-7. 
6 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981); John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2003); Colin Elman and Miriam Elman (eds.), Bridges and Boundaries (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2001). 
 
5 
agenda.7 And historical research is germane to the work of neo-classical realists such as 
Randall Schweller (as much as it was to Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr before them).8  
Of course, because many readers will question this claim, particularly in relation to 
neorealism, it is worth dwelling on this point for a moment. For while many would accept 
that neorealism deploys historical analysis, nevertheless the theory is seen as problematic 
because it is unable to explain international change – especially systems change – through 
historical time. This claim was first made in some of the key critical works of the early 
1980s, most notably those of John Ruggie, Richard Ashley and Robert Cox. Since then it has 
become an axiom of critical theory that neorealism ‘contains only a reproductive logic, but no 
transformational logic’;9 that neorealism is a ‘historicism of stasis; [one that] freezes the 
political institutions of the current world order’;10 or that ‘[p]roblem-solving [neorealist] 
theory is non-historical or ahistorical, since it, in effect, posits a continuing present’.11  
The immediate problem with this position is that neorealism can explain systems 
change. Thus, for example, Robert Gilpin has argued that changes in the international system 
– caused by states’ responses to the escalations of military costs experienced during the 
European Military Revolution (1550-1660) – induced the transformation of feudal 
Christendom into the modern sovereign state system.12 No less importantly, this argument 
could be made within a pure Waltzian framework, albeit one which has largely been 
developed outside the discipline.13 Even so, Gilpin’s account holds closely to the Waltzian 
                                                 
7 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Lisa 
Martin, ‘The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism’, in J.G. Ruggie ed. Multilateralism 
Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 91-121. 
8 Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World 
Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Unanswered Threats: Political 
Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006). For the 
broadly historical sociological aspect of Carr’s and Morgenthau’s arguments see J.M. 
Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 45-61. 
9 John Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neo-Realist 
Synthesis’, World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 285.  
10 Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization 38, no. 2 
(1984): 257. 
11 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory’, Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981): 129. 
12 Gilpin, War and Change, ch. 3. 
13 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988). For an explanation of the neorealist basis of Tilly’s approach see Hobson, State and 
International Relations, ch. 6; also Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical 
Sociology (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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format.14 Anarchic inter-state competition has been used to explain the rise and development 
not just of the modern European state but also of European capitalism (whether this has been 
conducted by realist IR scholars or realist-inspired historical sociologists).15 Likewise, 
although much critical (and constructivist) theory claims that neorealism is redundant 
because it neither foresaw nor explained the end of the Cold War, there are two issues which, 
through a sleight of hand, are conflated to produce this indictment: the Waltzian claim of the 
relative stability of a bipolar world and that international change could not take place without 
great power war.16 But absent these two specific criteria, at least one realist-inspired 
sociologist not only predicted the end of the Cold War but also provided an explanation of its 
demise.17 As such, it may well be that Waltz was un-necessarily defensive in asserting that 
neorealism cannot, nor should not, explain change where change is defined only by shifts in 
the ordering principles of the international system.18 
All this means that the familiar refrain that mainstream U.S. IR is void of either 
historical research or the capacity to explain international change turns out to be a fallacy at 
best and a pernicious construct at worst. Despite the claims made by numerous critical 
scholars, it would be fairer to say that Waltz sought not to banish history or historical analysis 
from IR but historicist conceptions of the international from the discipline (a point we return 
to in the next section).19 And more generally, the return of classical liberalism, the rise of 
neoclassical realism and constructivism, and the reconvening of approaches like the English 
School marks less the emergence of a historical turn in IR, but more an acceleration and 
deepening of trends already present in the discipline; trends which, it should be noted, can be 
                                                 
14 See Hobson, State and International Relations, ch. 2. 
15 For the former see Gilpin, War and Change; Gautam Sen, The Military Origins of 
Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry (London: Pinter, 1984); and for the latter 
see Randall Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), ch. 2; Jean Baechler, The Origins of Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975); Charles 
Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD. 990-1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). 
16 On this see, William Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International 
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/5): 91-129.  
17 Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory, ch. 8. 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My 
Critics’, in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), esp. 323-330. On this specific criticism, see Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and 
Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).  
19 See especially, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1979), 43-49. 
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extrapolated back to nineteenth-century IR scholarship.20 History has always served as a tool 
for testing the validity of theoretical positions, and both mainstream and non-mainstream 
scholarship is perfectly content to use history as a barometer or litmus test for adjudicating 
between rival schemas. Given this, it may be that the standard claim needs to be turned on its 
head. Rather than marginal historical voices facing an ahistorical mainstream, perhaps we are 
all, and have always been, historians after all. And if this is the case, we need to ask whether 
Northedge’s original rationale for setting up Millennium still stands up, or indeed if it ever 
did. Moreover, if it is the case that we are ‘all historians in IR’, this begs an important 
question: what is it we are talking about when we talk about history? 
 
 
Four modes of ‘History in IR’ 
 
Fundamental to our argument is the claim that there is no single mode of historical research 
in IR. Rather we see there as being four principal modes of historical enquiry, the excavation 
of which enables us to move beyond the current confusion that surrounds the way in which 
history is used in the discipline. We label these four ideal-typical modes: ‘history without 
historicism’, ‘historicist historical sociology’, ‘radical historicism’, and ‘traditional history’ 
(as represented in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Four modes of history in IR 
 
INSERT FIG 1 HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 On this see especially, Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1998). 
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The immediate point to note is that these four ideal-types are situated along a continuum 
ranging from the macro to the micro. Thus, while neorealist historical analysis occupies the 
highest level of generality, radical historicism represents its converse. Our own preferred 
approach is that of historicist historical sociology, which overlaps with the other three modes. 
Significantly, for all the heat of the ‘history wars’ that have taken place between critical 
historiographers and traditional historians, we see these two modes as having much in 
common, hence their overlapping representation in Figure 1. Our argument is that, answers to 
the question ‘what is history in IR’ will necessarily vary according to where the researcher 
sits on this continuum. Until we recognise this point, we shall be talking at cross-purposes, 
indeed speaking different ‘historical’ languages. In turn, this induces misunderstandings at 
the heart of the discipline and confusion over fundamental questions surrounding the nature 
of IR theory and how we ‘do’ historically informed research. In what follows, we take the 
two extremes that are situated at the poles of Figure 1 before proceeding to discuss traditional 
history and culminating in our preferred mode of analysis – historicist historical sociology.   
 
History without historicism 
Thus far we have noted that neorealism not only utilises and explores history but can also 
explain international systems change through time. Accordingly, this marks neorealist 
historiography as a legitimate mode of history in IR. By the same token, neoliberal 
institutionalism would also feature as an example of this kind of history. However, a common 
Highest level 
of generality
(Mega-macro)
Lowest level 
of generality
(Micro)
Mid-point
(Meso)
History without 
Historicism
(Constructionism)
Traditional 
History
(Particularism)
  Radical   
   Historicism   
  (Deconstructionism)
Historicist Historical Sociology
(Constructionism, Particularism,
Deconstructionism/Reconstructionism)
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claim (often made by constructivists) asserts that neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism 
are ahistorical and asociological on account of their assumption that actors are imbued with 
timeless essential properties that are pre-social.21 But the immediate problem here can be 
discussed through an analogous consideration of rational choice theorists working in the 
discipline of historical sociology. If the common IR perception is correct, then we would be 
forced to denounce prominent (rational choice) historical sociologists such as Douglass 
North, Margaret Levi and Edgar Kiser as ahistorical and asociological.22 And by implication 
it would mean that the many historical sociologists who use either implicit neorealist 
analytical or rational choice theoretical lenses are not, after all, historical sociologists; the 
end-point of which is to render the very term ‘historical sociology’ a misnomer.  
 Interestingly, debates on history/historical sociology within the discipline of historical 
sociology provide a mirror for the debates on history which we discuss in this article.23 In 
particular, Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter have advocated a form of rational choice ‘grand 
narrative’ historical-sociology, one which marries well with the kind of approach used by 
neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists.24 Kiser and Hechter invoke a mode of historical 
enquiry that operationalises the highest abstract ‘scope conditions’. As they put it, 
‘[h]istorically defined scope conditions are based on particular spatial and temporal 
parameters (e.g., a given argument may only apply to 17th century France). In contrast, 
abstract scope conditions merely contain general specifications of conditions that could exist 
in many times and places’.25 In particular, they object to the arguments of Quadagno and 
Knapp who, in effect, argue for an historicist approach that rejects transhistorical categories 
                                                 
21 E.g., Chris Reus-Smit, ‘The Idea of History and History with Ideas’, in Historical 
Sociology of International Relations, eds. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 120-40. 
22 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Edgar Kiser and Joshua Kane, ‘Revolution 
and State Structure: The Bureaucratization of Tax Administration in Early Modern England 
and France’, American Journal of Sociology 107, no. 1 (2001): 183-223. 
23 See especially Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, ‘The Role of General Theory in 
Comparative-Historical Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 1 (1991): 1-30; 
Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, ‘The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice 
Theory and Its Critics’, American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (1998): 785-816; Jill 
Quadagno and Stan Kapp, ‘Have Historical Sociologists Forsaken Theory? Thoughts on the 
History/Theory Relationship’, Sociological Methods and Research 20, no. 4 (1992): 481-507; 
Margaret R. Somers, ‘“We’re No Angels”: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationalism in 
Social Science’, American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (1998): 722-84. 
24 Kiser and Hechter, ‘Debate on Historical Sociology’. 
25 Kiser and Hechter, ‘Debate on Historical Sociology’, 797. 
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by pointing out the specificities of events according to their particular spatio-temporal 
contexts. Accordingly, the use of the term ‘historically defined scope conditions’ might be 
better expressed as ‘historicist’ scope conditions. For in our conception, ‘historicism’ – 
contra the ways in which it is frequently used, eg., from Karl Popper to Dipesh Chakrabarty26 
– is a mode of historical enquiry that recognises the specificity of events within their 
temporal and spatial contexts and rejects transhistorical categories that render history as 
exhibiting isomorphic properties. Accordingly, we term this mode ‘history without 
historicism’.   
 This mode of enquiry, Kiser and Hechter argue, has the virtue of establishing 
general/universalist propositions that can be applied across time and place. That is, they seek 
to construct not just a narrative but a grand narrative that has universal application. In turn, 
this means that their theoretical arguments are amenable to testing, thereby conforming to 
what they would consider to be strict social scientific criteria. And it also means that their 
approach is geared at predicting events either as they unfold or as they might unfold in the 
future. In support of this argument, one might even go so far as to ask rhetorically that if 
history provides no lessons for the present or the future then what utility does it have and, by 
implication, what is the purpose of studying it? Moreover, Kiser and Hechter note, ‘[w]e 
think that science progresses by testing clear general propositions and by attempting to 
resolve the anomalies that this testing process invariably reveals’.27 And, not surprisingly, 
this leads them to argue that such an historical mode of research is important because it 
allows the fulfilment of coherent research programs.  
 The summary produced by Kiser and Hechter reproduces the essence of ‘history 
without historicism’; a mode of history that underpins neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism within IR. Indeed all the criteria that they stipulate concerning an adequate 
historical sociology conform precisely to those laid down by neorealists (including Kenneth 
Waltz). And inverting the point made earlier, if Kiser and Hechter’s approach is a legitimate 
mode of historical sociology then by implication one might label neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism as representing a legitimate mode of historical enquiry.  
In this mode of historical analysis in an IR context, history takes on the role of 
‘scripture’ – as the application of ‘lessons’ and inviolate rules that can be used to inform 
current policy and support research hypotheses. So, for example, the ‘lessons of Nazi 
                                                 
26 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 2002); Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
27 Kiser and Hechter, ‘Debate on Historical Sociology’, 788. 
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appeasement’ become a shorthand for the necessity of confronting dictatorial regimes across 
time and place; the U.S. retreat from Vietnam is invoked to halt talk of withdrawal in Iraq; 
and the Reagan years are employed to support the idea that ultimate victory in the ‘war on 
terror’ rests on the deployment of overwhelming U.S. military superiority married to the 
promotion – by force if necessary – of democratic ideals around the world.28 All in all, 
history without historicism provides a potentially rich stream of data, producing lessons and 
acting as test-cases for deductively derived hypothesis. 
 
Radical Historicism 
Moving to the other extreme (situated on the right hand side of Figure 1) we encounter 
radical historicism. This mode of research first emerged within the field of literary criticism. 
It is based on the premise that a literary work can only be considered as a product of a 
particular time and place. That is, no text serves as the autonomous product of an author 
understood as an isolated creation, but is reflective of a unique cultural and intellectual 
milieu.29 This is a kind of deep contextualism, one which finds its clearest expression in the 
work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. In a recent example of radical historicism in 
IR, Nick Vaughan-Williams argues that the historical turn in IR needs to be deconstructed. 
For Vaughan-Williams, the idea of history deployed by most scholars of the historical turn in 
IR is ahistorical even to the point of being anti-historical. This new historicism marries up 
with the poststructuralist conception of IR theory, which subscribes to the radical 
indeterminacy of history. Thus Richard Ashley characterises the prevailing historical 
approaches in IR as akin to ‘a [form] of representation that arrests ambiguity and controls the 
proliferation of meaning by imposing a standard and a standpoint of interpretation that is 
taken to be fixed and independent of the time it represents’.30 This tendency, Vaughan-
Williams argues, is essentially ahistorical in the first instance because it 
 
implies the necessity (and possibility) of a stance outside of both history and 
politics from which it is possible to arrive at a singular understanding of what is 
often referred to as historicity… Such a stance is of course fantastical. More 
specifically still [such] an imposition has particularly important implications for IR 
                                                 
28 See also Markus Kornprobst, ‘Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading 
Uses of Historical Analogies’, Millennium 36, no. 2 (2007): 29-49. 
29 This was first discussed in Stephen Greenblatt, The Power of Forms in the English 
Renaissance (Norman, Oklahoma: Pilgrim Books, 1982). 
30 Richard K. Ashley, ‘Living on Borderlines: Man, Post-Structuralism, and War’, in 
International/Intertextual Relations, eds. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (New 
York: Lexington Books, 1989), 263. 
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since any attempt to stifle the ‘equivocity of history’ constitutes a violent 
dehistoricisation, which, in turn, may have significant political ramifications.31 
 
This reading holds that the truth is not out there simply awaiting discovery. In place of 
the truth that does not exist, there are many truths – indeed an undecidable infinity of possible 
truths. Ultimately this position embraces a view of history as an infinite problem that can 
never be mastered;32 to attempt to do so is merely to fall back into another totalising grand 
narrative. And so, for radical historicists, the historically-minded IR scholar (or any historian 
for that matter) can never arrive at the terminus of historical closure and is, therefore, 
necessarily stranded on a train journey-without-end. To disembark the train for firmer, stable 
ground is to sacrifice the history-ness of history that deconstructionism embraces ‘in favour 
of an ahistorical – even anti-historical – search for certainty, security, and surety in 
interpretive closure’,33 thereby placing firm historical meaning perpetually out of reach. 
What kind of history, then, does radical historicism produce? First and foremost, the 
approach rejects the construction of grand-narratives, thereby placing it at odds with the kind 
of macro-history that neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist IR theory produces. As implied 
above, reading history either through a theoretical lens or via the construction of a broader 
narrative is to fall into the trap of ‘mastering history’ so that it conforms to particular political 
and ideological ends. As such, the point of ‘doing history’ is to resist an attempt at ‘mastery’. 
Rather, deconstruction – either of the events themselves or of the histories that are 
constructed by historians/social scientists – reveals merely the doxa of power-political 
positions that lie beneath. 
Typical examples of this kind of thinking can be found in the postmodern wing of 
postcolonial studies and postcolonial International Relations. Following Edward Said,34 all 
modernist histories of the rise and development of the modern world or the modern 
international system are to be deconstructed to reveal the underlying Eurocentric/Orientalist 
metanarrative that informs them.35 In the process, such analyses reveal how major theories 
unwittingly reflect the hegemonic aspirations of the West. Moreover, these theories do not 
merely reflect, but also provide a sanctioning, legitimating function that constitutes Western 
thinking as imperialist-hegemonic. Likewise, such an approach seeks to reveal how Western 
                                                 
31 Vaughan-Williams, ‘Problem of History’, 117-118. 
32 See Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
33 Vaughan-Williams, ‘Problem of History’, 131. 
34 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978). 
35 E.g. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. 
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actions ultimately reflect a Eurocentric/Orientalist posture towards the non-West.36 And in 
strong contrast to the constructionist-narrative approach of mega-macro history, this mode 
insists on ‘deconstruction without reconstruction’ since reconstruction merely leads back into 
the cul-de-sac of a totalising grand narrative. Moreover, many go so far as to argue that 
because all attempts at writing history must conform to power-knowledge nexuses, 
reconstructing historical narratives should be avoided since this would act merely to replace 
one form of domination (Eurocentrism/Orientalism) with another (eg., Occidentalism).37 
Accordingly, radical historicism provides the antithesis of the grand-scale constructionism of 
the mega-macro approach.  
 
Traditional History 
Thus far we have differentiated between the two extremes represented in Figure 1 – 
constructionist ‘history without historicism’ and deconstructionist ‘radical historicism’. At 
one level, this might appear curious in that, as anyone familiar with the ‘history wars’ will 
know, the main combatants are traditional historians and critical historiographers. In our 
representation, rather than being diametrically opposed, these positions have much in 
common, so much so that they are represented as overlapping categories in Figure 1. As such, 
it makes sense to begin by briefly considering the issues that underlie the history wars before 
proceeding to consider the important similarities between traditional history and radical 
historicism. 
The main issue at stake in the history wars revolves around the difference between 
positivist research and deconstructionism.38 Radical historicists reject the test as to what 
                                                 
36 E.g. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996); Albert J. Paolini, Navigating Modernity (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Pal 
Ahluwalia, Politics and Post-Colonial Theory (London: Routledge, 2001); Naeem 
Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference 
(London: Routledge, 2004).  
37 Eg., Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Homi 
Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A 
Critique of Postcolonial Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
38 For the traditionalist perspective see: Arthur Marwick, ‘Two Approaches to Historical 
Study: The Metaphysical (Including Post-Modernism) and the Historical’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 30, no. 1 (1995): 5-35; David Cannadine (ed.), What is History Now? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004); Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 
2001). For the critical historiographical position, see Hayden White, The Content of the Form 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); and Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London: 
Routledge, 1991). For a pertinent summary within an IR context see Vaughan-Williams 
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constitutes ‘proper history’, at least in the way that this is deployed by traditional historians. 
In the traditionalist conception, ‘proper history’ is based on a Rankerean positivist 
methodology in that the fact-value distinction enables the historian to generate a form of 
truth, at least as far as this is accessible via appropriate training, archival research and 
immersion in primary documents. Traditional historians are comfortable with the view that 
there is a world ‘out there’ which can be explained via considered, learned historical analysis. 
A rigorous ‘objective/a-theoretical’ approach to relics (archives/primary documents) is vital 
to this process. Ultimately though, a causal analysis of any event is attainable such that 
critical deconstructionism is seen as making non-sense of history, thereby leading to the 
familiar accusations of nihilism and anti-historical posturing. Moreover, traditional historians 
complain that radical historicists essentially mock history. As one prominent positivist 
historian writes: ‘Auschwitz was not a discourse. It trivialises mass murder to see it as a text. 
The gas chambers were not a piece of rhetoric. Auschwitz was indeed inherently a tragedy 
and cannot be seen as either a comedy or a farce’.39  
Traditional historians reject the application of aprioristic theoretical templates to the 
study of history, thereby differentiating themselves from those modes of history that are 
situated on the left-hand side of Figure 1 (i.e. mega-macro history and historicist historical 
sociology). Viewing history through theoretical lenses is seen as futile. Indeed, theoretically-
informed approaches are denounced not just for their theoretical apriorism but also for their 
reliance on secondary sources. This, in turn, leads to the claim that such approaches are either 
grand-syntheses or simply ‘make-believe’ versions of the ‘true’ historical record, in which 
theoretically-informed scholars select the ‘facts’ in advance without holding them to 
objective scrutiny. Overall, traditional historians dismiss theoretically-informed historical 
approaches for simply ‘making up history’ in pursuit of a theoretical vision and compressing 
or forcing the complexities of history into facile pigeon-holes.40  
However, it could be argued that, with the exception of the sacrosanct status accorded 
to ‘facts’ and relics, these objections are not really so different to the denouncements made by 
radical historicists of theoretically-informed historical narratives. Both of these apparently 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘“Problem of History’”, 119-125. And for an equally pertinent summary of the traditional and 
new critical variants of International History see Finney, ‘Still “Marking Time”’, 291-309. 
39 Evans, Defence of History, 124. 
40 It is noteworthy that one traditional historian was said to have claimed in a private 
conversation that he revelled in undertaking historical research into the problems of Northern 
Ireland because in the process he had managed to undermine every general theory that has 
ever been applied to this case.  
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antithetical modes of analysis exhibit incredulity to grand narratives. Both see such visions as 
unhistorical and presentist. Both fetishise the particular in order to resist the pitfalls of a 
grand narrative; indeed their immediate shared instinct is to particularise. Both modes trace 
how one-thing-followed-another in an unfolding of events that is deemed to be so contingent 
as to be unreplicable. Both agree that such approaches impose dangerous ideological visions 
on world history. Thus where traditional historians see such visions as ‘bad historical 
polemic’, radical historicists see them as ‘ahistorical totalising projects’. And, of course, both 
tend to deride transhistorical attempts to present universalist pictures of causation that range 
across time and place. In this sense both approaches in effect place broad theoretical findings 
out of reach. Indeed, both traditional historians and radical historicists deconstruct grand 
narratives while refusing, albeit for different reasons, to reconstruct an alternative.  
Thus despite their epistemological differences (which have captured all the 
headlines), traditional historians and radical historicists converge around a tendency to 
particularism and in a shared resistance to theoretically-inspired narratives. As such, both 
approaches are far more alike then they would care to think, at least about the make-up of the 
social world and the possibility of historical theorisation. Thus although the history wars 
evidenced a tremendous amount of heat, this appears inversely proportional to the amount of 
light that the debate emits. For behind the fire and brimstone lies a far less melodramatic, but 
much more important, set of shared assumptions, assumptions that are unacknowledged. 
  
Historicist Historical sociology  
The fourth mode of historical analysis – historicist historical sociology – occupies a central 
place on our diagram. As such, it overlaps with the other three modes of analysis and, 
importantly, contains many self-defined historical sociologists and potentially other historians 
who might consider their primary identity as situated outside of the traditional conception of 
history. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the major figures associated with the view of 
history employed by historicist historical sociologists is E.H. Carr. In his now classic 
Trevelyan lectures, Carr delved behind some of the most prominent myths about both history 
and theory to ask an apparently simple, yet also disarmingly difficult, question: what is 
history?41  
Carr’s work helps point up the cues that differentiate historicist historical sociology 
from the other modes that we have outlined here. In essence, the mega-macro, positivist 
                                                 
41 E.H. Carr, What is History? (London: Pelican, 1964). 
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theory-builders envisage history as ‘abstracted scripture’, while radical historicists and 
traditional historians view it as akin to a random series of isolated movements, or as  
‘contingent butterfly’. Thus where one fetishises general abstractions, the others fetishise the 
particular. The mega-macro conception relates history in which all discontinuities are ironed 
out through creating isomorphic transhistorical categories. Traditional history and radical 
historicism obscure the sense in which history is a social process, one in which contingent 
historical events, dramas and processes are part of broader interrelations, sequences, plots and 
concatenations which provide a shape – however difficult to discern – within historical 
development. For Carr, not unlike radical historicists but in clear contrast to the practice of 
traditional historians, the first step in studying history is to study both the historian and the 
broader context (the historical, social, political, economic environment) within which (s)he 
carries out research and within which historical facts are accumulated. Thus the fact that 
historical relics never speak for themselves but are embedded within broader social matrices 
means that there can be no absolute truth about the past in the way promoted by traditional 
historians. This means that historicism is closely linked to the idea of contextualism that was 
developed by the likes of Quentin Skinner in the ‘Cambridge School’.42 
Carr as well as Skinner are not the only historians who contribute to historicist 
historical sociology. For example, Carl Becker famously questioned the status of historical 
facts, seeing them as symbolic, contextual constellations made up from a thousand or more 
discarded events which both surrounded and sustained them.43 R.G. Collingwood argued that 
history revealed the mind of the historian, promoting a form of neo-Hegelian ‘historical 
imagination’ in which history became little more than the history of ideas and historical 
research the re-enactment of past.44 And Carr himself argued that history was a ‘selective 
system’, an inherently social process best considered as a dialogue between past and present 
societies. For Carr, historical explanations are inherently approximate. This does not mean 
the end of adequate historical explanation. Rather, the conversation between past, present and 
future contained within Carr’s vision of historical method means that the historian’s task 
becomes that of differentiating between significant and accidental causes, providing 
                                                 
42 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). For a discussion of this in an IR-context see, Duncan Bell, ‘Political 
theory and the functions of intellectual history’, Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 
(2003): 151-60. 
43 Carl Becker, ‘What are historical facts?’, The Western Political Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1955): 
327-40. On contextual constellations, see Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Why Political Economy 
Needs Historical Sociology’, International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 390-413. 
44 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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intelligible meaning in a world of incessant change and contestation, and remaining open to 
new facts, interpretations and explanations of a subject.45 Such an understanding of history 
lies at the heart of historicist historical sociology.  
But in the process historicist historical sociology also draws in many ways from 
various aspects of the other three modes. Epistemologically, historicist historical sociology 
stands between the constructionist mega-macro approach at one extreme and the micro 
approaches of deconstructionist radical historicism and traditional history at the other. Contra 
radical historicists, historicist historical sociologists accept that history is knowable but, pace 
traditional historians, they insist that traditional historians cannot claim to be speaking an 
objective truth insofar as history is produced within a certain time and place and subject to 
the interpretations of its practitioners. Moreover, further echoing radical historicists, some of 
these historical sociologists aim to deconstruct historical narratives on the grounds, for 
example, of their implicit Eurocentrism. But contra the new historicists, these historical 
sociologists then seek to reconstruct history along non-Eurocentric lines.46 Echoing the 
mega-macro approach, historicist historical sociology seeks out general patterns of causation 
and development. But echoing traditional history, it also places emphasis on historical 
discontinuities and rejects transhistoricism. In short, this approach recognises the role of 
accident, contingency, agency, contextuality and particularity alongside that played by 
structure and continuity. Thus, if traditional historians and new historicists reify contingency, 
discontinuity and particularity while macro approaches reify structural continuities, this 
middle-ground historicism seeks to grasp all of these categories. As such, historicist historical 
sociology claims to be able to ‘do it all’.  
The upshot of this claim is that the assumption of diametrically opposed modes of 
history obscures the point that historicist historical sociology can reconcile some, though by 
no means all, of the differences. And resolving differences where possible seems a more 
productive way to move forward than to insist on preserving differences through gatekeeping 
exercises or the policing of borders. 
 
 
                                                 
45 Of course, this is a task Carr performed himself, not least in his definitive accounts of the 
Russian revolution and its aftermath.   
46 See for example: Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998); J.M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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The three waves of Historical Sociology in IR? 
 
Because elsewhere we have presented overviews of the development of historical sociology 
in IR (HSIR from henceforth),47 we shall provide only a potted summary here. It is possible 
to discern two waves of HSIR, with a third-wave now in the offing. The first emerged 
through the writings of figures such as Michael Mann, Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens and 
Charles Tilly. However, since the mid-1990s, a second wave has emerged which takes issue 
with neorealism (as well as the implicit neorealism that underpins the conception of the 
international contained in the first wave).48 
One theme that underpins the second wave concerns the objective of overcoming 
‘tempocentrism’; something which pervades neorealist historiography. Tempocentric history 
takes a reified present and extrapolates this back in time to render all history amenable to 
transhistorical, universalist analysis.49 Neorealists, for example, take the ‘fact’ of 
contemporary ‘anarchy’ and effectively extrapolate this back in time, removing the ruptures 
that punctuate the world-historical longue durée. As such, neorealist ‘history without 
historicism’ is a form of inverted path-dependency in which all actors and, indeed, the 
international system itself, are presented as homologous or isomorphic. Thus we are told that 
the superpower contest between the United States and the Soviet Union finds its historical 
equivalent in the conflict between Athens and Sparta; that ancient imperialism is equivalent 
to that found in Europe between 1492 through to the twentieth century;50 or that European 
feudal heteronomy is equivalent in its modus operandi to that of the modern international 
                                                 
47 E.g., J.M. Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake in “Bringing Historical Sociology Back into 
International Relations”? Transcending “Chronofetishism” and Tempocentrism” in 
International Relations’, in Historical Sociology of International Relations, eds. Hobden and 
Hobson, 3-41; J.M. Hobson, ‘Historical Sociology’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of 
International Relations and Global Politics, ed. Martin Griffiths (London: Routledge, 2005); 
George Lawson, ‘The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations’ 
International Studies Review 8, no. 3 (2006): 397-423; George Lawson, ‘Historical Sociology 
in International Relations: Open Society, Research Programme and Vocation’ International 
Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 343-68.  
48 It was, of course, deeply ironic that as IR scholars turned to historical sociologists for the 
means to transcend neorealism, historical sociologists began to employ neorealist 
understandings of the international. On this point, see: Hobden, International Relations; 
Hobson, State and International Relations, ch. 6. See also the discussions by George Lawson, 
John Hobson and Fred Halliday in the forum on Michael Mann in Millennium 34, no. 2 
(2006): 476-550. 
49 Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake?’, 9-15. 
50 See especially Waltz, Theory, ch. 2. 
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system.51 Likewise, this approach induces tempocentric statements such as the ‘classic 
history of Thucydides is as meaningful a guide to the behavior of states today as when it was 
written in the fifth century BC’;52 or that ‘balance of power politics in much the form that we 
know it has been practiced over the millennia by many different types of political units, from 
ancient China and India, to the Greek and Italian city states, and unto our own day’.53 Thus 
terms such as sovereignty, balance of power and anarchy are employed without due regard 
for time and place specificity; instead they take on a stable, fixed transhistorical meaning.54  
The antidote that second-wave HSIR scholars provide is not so much a reversion to 
extreme particularity (as in traditional history) but an historicist approach which is able to 
construct a narrative while simultaneously being open to issues of contingency, unintended 
consequences, particularity and contextuality. And a further key difference between this 
second-wave HSIR and neorealist ‘history without historicism’ concerns the former’s 
emphasis on social structure. Utilising this approach, second-wave scholars have looked to 
transcend the tempocentrism of neorealist historiography and first wave HSIR by seeking to 
reveal the differing social contexts that inform the conduct and constitution of international 
relations.55 In the process they are able to show how contemporary world politics is 
historically double-edged; having one foot in the past but also being in certain respects 
unique. And they are able to reveal how international systems and international actors change 
their identities and forms over time according to differing social contexts. For the most part 
the various ways in which this has taken place differ along ontological lines, with 
epistemological issues taking a secondary role within HSIR.56  
                                                 
51 Markus Fischer, ‘Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourses and Conflictual 
Practices’, International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 427-466. For a critique of this 
general move, see Lawson, ‘Promise’. 
52 Gilpin, War and Change, 7. 
53 Waltz, ‘Reflections’, 341. 
54 This is even the case in those studies which look to ‘test’ these concepts historically. See, 
for example, Stuart Kaufman, Richard Little and William Wohlforth (eds.), Balance of Power 
in World History (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
55 In addition to the contributions to the edited volume, Historical Sociology of International 
Relations, second-wave HSIR has also been showcased in various journal fora: Review of 
International Political Economy 5, no. 2 (1998): 284-361 comprising John Hobson, Hendrik 
Spruyt, Sandra Halperin and Martin Shaw; International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 341-449, 
comprising George Lawson, Roland Dannreuther and James Kennedy, Leonard Seabrooke, John 
Hobson, and Bryan Mabee. 
56 And for a postmodernist critique of this emphasis see Steve Smith, ‘Historical Sociology 
and International Relations Theory’, in Historical Sociology of International Relations, eds. 
Hobden and Hobson, 223-43. 
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Second wavers come from a variety of theoretical schools. Marxists have explored 
how class relations generate diverse forms of international relations across time and place, 
and how these have engendered the rise of important institutions.57 Constructivist and critical 
theorists have not only problematised the sovereign state,58 but have also revealed how the 
changing moral purpose of the state generates distinct international institutional 
environments,59 discrete forms of national identity,60 and different relations between states 
more generally.61 English School writers have focussed on the changing social norms that 
underpin international society,62 as well as on the ways in which international systems shift 
along a continuum between hierarchy and anarchy.63 Neo-Weberians have demonstrated how 
varying state-society relations have promoted different international financial systems,64 and 
have studied the ways in which forms of radical change have both constituted, and been 
constituted by, their broader relationship with the international realm.65 In this vein, cognate 
work is being undertaken in ‘relational HSIR’.66 And, last but not least, HSIR is increasingly 
contributing to the ‘civilisational turn’ in IR.67  
                                                 
57 Cf. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society (London: Verso, 1994); Benno Teschke, 
The Myth of 1648 (London: Verso, 2003); Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and 
Industrial Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
58 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber eds. State Sovereignty as Social Construct 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); cf. Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in 
Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
59 Chris Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
60 Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999).  
61 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).  
62 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1984); Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Shogo Suzuki, ‘Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European 
International Society’, European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005): 137-
164. 
63Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992).  
64 Leonard Seabrooke, The Social Sources of Financial Power (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
65 George Lawson, Negotiated Revolutions (London: Ashgate, 2005). Some elements of neo-
Weberian thinking can also be found in Fred Halliday, Revolution in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 1999).  
66 See eg., Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, Process, 
and the Study of World Politics’ European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 
291-332. 
67 See eg., Hobson, Eastern Origins; Hobson, ‘Is Critical Theory always for the White West 
and for Western Imperialism?’; Andrew Linklater, ‘Norbert Elias, the “Civilising Process” 
and International Relations’, International Politics 41 (2004): 3-35; Robbie Shilliam, ‘What 
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 In its first two waves, therefore, historical sociology asserted itself as a broad 
movement capable of incorporating a number of paradigms and explaining a wide range of 
important issues in IR. Although proponents shared an understanding of the importance of 
discontinuity, contingency and particularity in international processes, these approaches also 
shared a concern for examining how social structures – in the form of relatively fixed 
configurations of social relations – shaped international events. As such, historical sociology 
offered a double punch: not just a focus on the historical details of particular dimensions of 
international relations, but also an emphasis on causal explanations wherever these were 
located, specifying how patterns, configurations and sets of social relations combined in 
particular contexts to determine certain outcomes. As such, second-wave historical 
sociologists do not just provide historical analysis, but they also generate powerful theoretical 
explanations.  
However, in recent years, a further move has begun, one with its origins in two 
concerns. The first is the broadness of second-wave historical sociology and, in particular, 
over whether its ‘catholicism’ has produced a dilution in the underlying approach.68 This call 
for heightened specificity is matched by a second concern over the extent to which ‘the 
international’ itself has, as yet, failed to become a core feature of historical sociological 
explanations, both in IR and further afield. As such, some historical sociologists working in 
IR are beginning to develop a more focussed approach towards illuminating the social logic 
of ‘the international’. Justin Rosenberg, for example, has argued that the international can be 
theorised by virtue of the simultaneous existence of plural, but connected, forms of economic, 
political and social organisation.69 Indeed, the dialectical relationship between unevenness 
and interactivity sees historical development itself as, if not following a path of 
predetermined linearity, nevertheless exhibiting certain regularities – for example the 
‘privilege of historical backwardness’ which allows societies to learn from others and leap 
ahead via ‘innovative fusions’ of existing technologies. By focusing on these spurts – what 
                                                                                                                                                        
about Marcus Garvey?’, Review of International Studies 32, no. 3 (2006): 379-400; P.T. 
Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006); Martin 
Hall and P.T. Jackson (eds.), Civilizational Identity (New York: Palgrave, 2007); and see also 
the earlier work by Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation (London: Pluto, 
1990). 
68 For more on this critique, see Lawson ‘Research Programme, Open Society, Vocation’. 
69 Justin Rosenberg, ‘Why is there no International Historical Sociology?’ European Journal 
of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 307-40; Justin Rosenberg, ‘The Higher Bullshit: 
A Reply to the Globalization Theory Debate’, International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 450-82; 
Justin Rosenberg, ‘Uneven and Combined Development: The Social-Relational Substratum 
of “the International”?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21, no. 1 (2008): 77-112. 
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Giddens, Gellner and Mann call ‘neo-episodic moments’, or what William Sewell describes 
as ‘the conjuncture of structures’ – it is possible to attain both an explanation of the complex 
movement of historical processes and retain broader analytical appeal.70  
Herein, we believe, lies the seed for a possible third wave of HSIR; one which presses 
scholars to develop a ‘theory of the international’. Given that this is something that is 
surprisingly lacking within the discipline of IR, we believe that by tackling this issue head-on 
so HSIR can speak directly to the core issues of IR, thereby helping to promote a much 
stronger convergence of, and direct conversation between, these literatures than has been 
achieved hitherto.71  
 
 
Conclusion: Re-imagining IR  
 
The question ‘what is history in IR’ is not one of importance just to historical sociologists in 
IR. Rather, it is one with major ramifications for the discipline as a whole. As this article has 
demonstrated, history does not belong to a single theoretical approach: history comes in 
plural modes rather than in singular form. Indeed, history is, in many ways, the lowest 
common denominator of the various paradigms within the discipline. Given this, it becomes 
particularly important to establish precisely what we mean by ‘history in IR’. In the process, 
we find that there is not one but four different ways of ‘doing’ history in IR. And the 
scholar’s choice of a particular mode of history becomes constitutive of the way in which 
(s)he theorises and understands international relations (as much as vice versa).  
Accordingly, if we are all historians now, we are differentiated not simply by our 
choice of theory but also by our selection of a particular historical mode of explanation. 
Revealing these four modes of history in IR provides a hitherto obscured organising 
dimension of the discipline. Beyond simple binaries such as ‘critical theory vs. problem-
solving theory’, ‘British vs. American IR’, or ‘mainstream vs. non-mainstream theories’ lies a 
complex network of promiscuous linkages, interactions and synergies, as well as some sharp 
differences, that underpin ‘histories in IR’. Taking such a view necessarily complicates our 
                                                 
70 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986); Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964); 
Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity, 1985); William 
Sewell, Logics of History (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
71 See J.M. Hobson, George Lawson and Justin Rosenberg (eds.), International Historical 
Sociology (forthcoming). 
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conception of IR, transcending the antinomies that all-too-often mark the limits of the 
discipline’s self-conception. In short, therefore, recognising a more complex picture of 
history in IR could allow both for more fruitful dialogue between IR scholars and enable the 
discipline to be re-imagined beyond some of its more obfuscatory constructs. In this way, it 
becomes possible both to see, and to potentially transcend, some of the current limits of the 
international imagination. 
